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The possibility that the system of specifications pres-
ently followed by Naval Facilities Engineering Command
(NAVFAC) acts as a significant barrier to the transfer and
utilization of new technology into Navy construction is
analyzed. Specific areas are investigated using personal
interviews and emphasis is placed on identifying and under-
standing the barriers and to improve the efficiency of tech-
nology transfer within the Navy.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The objective of this thesis is to demonstrate that the
system of specifications presently followed by the Naval
Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC) is a significant
barrier to the transfer and utilization of new technology
into Navy construction.
NAVFAC ' s attempt to standardize Navy construction through
the use of type or guide specifications is discussed and
several shortcomings are identified.
The current index of NAVFAC specifications was reviewed
and random samples taken. It became apparent from the wide
range of publication dates that the necessary review and re-
vision process is not keeping pace with the advancement in
technology.
Extensive interviews were conducted with civilian archi-
tect-engineer and contracting firms. With few exceptions
all agreed that the content of the current specifications
were cumbersome, ambiguous, and lengthy. It was found that
often because of the above mentioned problems, contractors
failed to study the specifications sufficiently and bid on
contracts after only a cursory review, creating cost over-
runs, completion delays and resulting claims against the
Navy.
The impracticality of the use of universal specifica-
tions is discussed. The fact that soil conditions, climate,
and natural disaster threats may require completely dissimi-
lar types of construction makes this basic concept infeasible
Often certain types of material specified in these universal
specifications in unavailable. This fact alone caused some
of the contractors interviewed to add a significant amount
to cost estimates submitted for Navy contracts.
The procedures of utilization of specifications by in-
house engineers is carefully reviewed. Considerable diver-
gence was found among the different Engineering Field
Divisions on the proper interpretation of type and guide
specifications. The procedure for changing an existing
specification was investigated. It was found that very few
of the engineers interviewed knew of a procedure to request
a change to a specification. Very little written guidance
on this procedure could be found.
Value Engineering utilized within the Navy today is dis-
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I. INTRODUCTION
Why does it cost the Navy 10% to 15% more than a private
concern to have an equivalent building constructed? Why
does the Navy continue to use expensive metal piping when
private industry uses a relatively inexpensive plastic pipe
which is in many cases superior? Why won't the Navy use a
new type of aircraft runway joint sealer which has a demon-
strated life of over nine years instead of continuing to use
one which repeatedly fails in around two? (Appendix A)
Numerous other examples of the Navy's failure to utilize the
latest, most effective, most economical procedures or ma-
terials can also be cited.
A . BACKGROUND
Although the above questions reflect a very real prob-
lem, they are not intended to imply that the government or
the Navy is unconcerned with the transfer and use of the
latest technology. On the contrary, both presently have
ambitious programs which have as their goal to improve the
dissimination and utilization of the latest technological
developments. The federal government's oldest and probably
most effective technology transfer program is the U.S. De-
partment of Agriculture's Extension Service which was
created before the turn of the century. Research results
from the Department of Agriculture are effectively dissemi-
nated to all states and practically all counties of the
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nation through this extension service. Outside the field
of agriculture the NASA Technology Transfer Program is prob-
ably the best known Federal technology transfer program
today. NASA has even contracted the Denver Research Insti-
ture (DRI), University of Denver, to carry on a continuing
project for the Analysis of Technology Transfer (PATT).
PATT is aimed at increasing what is known about the ways
that technologies generated for government programs are
acquired and applied by persons in non-aerospace sectors of
the American economy. In fact, all major Federal agencies
have ongoing programs to encourage the transfer of new tech-
nology resulting from their R&D efforts to be used by their
own organizations and by other sectors.
Of the military services, the Navy has indeed been the
forerunner in the field of technology transfer. It was the
first military service to issue an implementing instruction
requiring an active technology transfer program. The in-
struction called for the designation of a person as a con-
tact for technology transfer in the various laboratories
and components of the Navy Material Command. The Naval
Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC) in particular has
made considerable effort to establish programs to encourage
the transfer and utilization of new technological informa-
tion within its organization. Examples of NAVFAC s efforts
in this area include the RDT&E Liaison Program and various
Naval Civil Engineering Laboratory (NCEL) activities and
publications such as RDT&E Assistance, RAP Briefs, TECH DATA
Sheets, and CEL Abstracts.
There has also been a continuing effort by the civilian
sector on the subject of technology transfer. Typical ex-
amples are the Seminars held by the leading universities
such as the one held in late March 1968 on the campus of
UCLA. Over two-hundred top level managers from industry and
academic scholars met and discussed problems facing industry
and institutions of higher learning. Another example of the
successful study and implementation of technology transfer
is the success story of IBM. IBM has an enviable record in
new product introduction yet it has rarely been first with
new developments in the field. How? One technical manager
estimates that IBM is one year behind at the research stage.
However, it is generally agreed that IBM in the marketplace
is one year ahead of its competitors. In order to turn this
one year disadvantage into one year advantage it is obvious
that IBM has been able to transfer whatever technology was
required, from the laboratories to the marketplace at a very
rapid rate.
There appears to be a conflict between the opening ques-
tions of this thesis and the discussion of current endeavors
in the technology transfer field. A close analysis of the
discussion however, especially the government and military
sections reveal the fact that the primary emphasis is on
dissemination vice utilization of the technical information.
There also appears to be relatively little concern for the
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transfer of new technologies into government or military
activities from private industry. To discover what inhibits
this inflow and utilization of new technologies from private
industry to Navy construction activities would help answer
the opening questions.
Research and study applied to the introduction of new
technology over the past decade has identified numerous
barriers that hinder adoption. Major barriers such as com-
munications methods, organizational structures, personali-
ties, and management practices have all been studied
extensively. Bibliographies on technology transfer contain
numerous books and articles on each of the above topics.
Rather than to theorize on the broader scope of barriers to
technology transfer the purpose of this thesis is to identi-
fy and discuss one particular barrier. The specification
system used by the Naval Facilities Engineering Command is
that barrier.
B. OBJECTIVE
The objective of this thesis is to demonstrate that the
system of specifications presently followed by NAVFAC is a
significant barrier to the transfer and utilization of new
technology into Navy construction. By breaking down this
barrier major strides can be made towards providing higher
quality Navy construction projects at a lower cost.
New is defined as: that which is new to the user but
not necessarily new in time.
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C . METHODOLOGY
The major source of data used as the primary basis for
analysis was obtained through extensive personal interviews
conducted by the authors. Prior to commencement of the
interviews the authors undertook two studies: (1) all perti-
nent NAVFAC and Engineering Field Division instructions and
directives were carefully reviewed for possible specifica-
tion barriers to the transfer of technology and (2) an ex-
tensive study effort was undertaken on the proper procedures
for conducting personal interviews.
Approximately 40 personal interviews were then conducted
at various NAVFAC Engineering Field Divisions and at civil-
ian firms. The personnel interviewed within the Engineering
Field Divisions consisted of engineers, Branch Managers and
Division and Department Heads. The civilian interviews were
with the heads of the respective firms. Approximately one
fourth of the interviews were with civilian architect-engi-
neer firms and contractors.
All interviews were conducted with both authors present
and began with an explanation of the nature of the research.
The interviews were not formalized but were tailored to the
interviewee and were intended to provide the researchers
with an insight into the atmosphere, attitude, and functions
of the activity being interviewed. The goal was to estab-
lish a rapport with the interviewee and then find out his





In essense, the Naval Facilities Engineering Command,
(NAVFAC), with cognizance over all Navy land structure con-
struction, has attempted to standardize its building pro-
jects through the use of type or guide specifications. As
will be discussed in detail later in the chapter, these
guide specifications cover virtually all aspects of Navy
construction projects and are to be used as manuscripts in
preparing individual project specifications. Guide specifi-
cations will normally refer to various government publica-
tions such as Federal and military specifications, the
National Bureau of Standards Handbook
,
and other similar
documents. They also may refer to non-government documents
such as American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM),
United States of America Standards Institute Standards
,
American Welding Society and others of this nature. The
NAVFAC Engineering Field Division (EFD) specification writers
or civilian architect-engineer firms then tailor these guide
specifications so that they will be appropriate for a par-
ticular project. On the surface this seems to be a legiti-
mate undertaking, however in reality there are numerous
inherent shortcomings. The remainder of this chapter will
be devoted to the identification and discussion of the as-
pects of this specification system which act as a barrier
to the transfer and use of new technology.
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B. OBSOLETE SPECIFICATIONS
There are certain characteristics of the guide specifi-
cations used by NAVFAC activities which hinder the expedi-
tious and economical completion of a Navy construction
project. The one which probably has the largest impact is
the fact that many of the guide specifications themselves
and the referenced specifications within them are obsolete.
Appendix B gives the statistical breakdown of the age dis-
tribution of the guide specifications currently in use by
NAVFAC. It is based on a random sample of 107 specif ica-
2tions taken from NAVFAC Publication P-34. Noting that the
mean age of the random sample is 1966, with some being as
old as 1954, it is apparent that the review and revision
process is not keeping up with advancements in technology.
The present system calls for a review of NAVFAC used Federal
Military, and Special Specifications whenever the existing
edition is five years old. NAVFAC Headquarters personnel
are tasked with this review and admittedly they are not
sufficiently staffed to keep these reviews current. In
fact, because of the rapid advancements being made in tech-
nology today, a daily review would hardly be adequate to
keep abreast of new developments in certain areas.
Although there is a provision in each guide specifica-
tion for the user to update the referenced specifications
to reflect its latest revision, this does not account for
2 P-34 is the index of NAVFAC Specifications used in
contracts for Public Works.
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the very real possibilities that either the revision is
outdated or that a completely new product exists to do the
job. Numerous examples of obsolescence were discovered by
the authors. One concerning a design for gasoline storage
is illustrative. A public works officer contracted a local
architect-engineer to produce a design for storage of un-
leaded gasoline for the Navy Exchange Service Station. In
accordance with standard procedure, the architect was pro-
vided with Navy specifications to use in his design. These
specifications however, called for the use of a metalic tank
which had long since been supplanted by a fiberglass tank in
the commercial community. The fiberglass tank was less ex-
pensive and more durable than the type called for in the
Navy specification. Fortunately the architect; one, was
aware of the new product; two, made the effort to introduce
it; and three, was able to get the cognizant Navy personnel
to commit themselves to its use. However, if any of the
above three elements were missing, the Navy would have spent
more money for an inferior product due to the use of an ob-
solete specification. In the opinion of the authors, one of
these three elements: awareness, effort, commitment, is
missing a significant amount of the time.
C. CONTENT OF SPECIFICATIONS
Another feature of the NAVFAC guide specifications which
has detrimental effects on Navy construction projects is
their structure and content. Every civilian architect-engineer
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and contractor, and most of the Navy employed engineers who
were interviewed agreed that NAVFAC specifications were very
lengthy, cumbersome, and ambiguous. To impress upon the
authors that Navy specifications were excessively long, one
of the architect-engineers interviewed made a bet that he
could sit at his desk and point out the Navy specifications
on the bookshelf across the room just by the thickness. He
did it! Apparently this wordiness has evolved over the
years by using the philosophy that if you add enough verbage
to the specifications you can cover all contingencies and
thereby close the loop-holes and reduce contractor disputes.
Unfortunately, the ultimate effect of this process is merely
to compound the initial problem.
The specifications are so long and cumbersome, 30 pages
for a ten foot section of pipe was an example shown these
authors, that often the contractors do not study them suffi-
ciently. By their own admission, contractors will often get
the basic idea of the job from the plans, check only the
major procurement items in the specifications and then bid
the job based on common construction practices rather than
the detailed specifications. One reason for this is that
approximately 90% of the work is subcontracted, often to
small local companies who do not have the personnel or re-
sources to research the unique Navy specification system.
This research procedure, even when attempted is also hampered
considerably by the fact that many of the specifications are
not available locally at the Public Works Offices and Centers
16
This claim was verified by these authors. Using a random
sample of 100 NAVFAC guide specifications taken from P-34,
one Public Works Office held only nine.
For the contractor or subcontractors to wade through
these lengthy specifications and research all the referenced
military and Federal specifications and standards is a pro-
hibitive task. Consequently, they often only give them a
cursory review and the result is that they cannot use many
of the methods and materials upon which they originally based
their bid. They are forced to go to other suppliers at a
higher cost and often at the expense of a significant time
delay. At the very least, the number of disputes with Navy
inspectors increases considerably, usually resulting in
claims against the Navy, completion delays, and cost over-
runs.
D. APPLICABILITY OF SPECIFICATIONS
Another problem concerns the applicability of specifica-
tions. This particular drawback was concurred with by the
Navy employed engineers and outside firms alike. It con-
cerns a fallacy in the basic concept of standardizing spec-
ifications for Navy-wide construction. To specify a
particular material for a particular job for virtually any
location in the world is not feasible. The main reason is
that different soil conditions, climate, natural disaster
threats, etc. may require completely dissimilar types of
construction. Unavailability of certain types of materials
in some areas is another reason that makes a universal
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specification impractical. One architect-engineer stated
that he added 20% to his cost estimates on Navy contracts
because of the difficulty in obtaining materials which meet
the specif ications. Sometimes a material is no longer in
production which means that an extensive search for remain-
ing stock must be made or the product must be specially
fabricated for that particular job. Consequently, adhering
strictly to one specification for all areas of the world,
in all cases, would result in major construction deficiencies
and escalated material costs.
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III. THE PROCEDURES FOR USING SPECIFICATIONS
A. IN-HOUSE DESIGN ENGINEERS USE OF SPECIFICATIONS
The following quote from the report of a conference
sponsored by the Denver Research Institute, University of
Denver seems appropriate to introduce a discussion of the
role of design engineers and their use of specifications.
"There seemed to be an underlying assumption at this confer-
ence that action for really effective technology transfer
should start with potential users, rather than the sources.
The potential user must be identified, aroused, motivated,
aware that a technological solution exists, and willing to
exert effort to adapt the potentially useful technology to
his needs," [Ref. 16, p. 3]. In this study, the potential
user is the Navy, and one could trace the benefits through
the government and back to the taxpayer. However, this
study is concerned with the Navy design engineers and how
the specification system effects their role as potential
users of new technology.
Only 25% to 30% of Navy construction design efforts are
initiated by in-house design engineers. The remainder is
contracted out to civilian architect-engineer firms. The
engineers at the NAVFAC Engineering Field Divisions (EFDs)
however, review all major architect-engineer design at the
30%, 60%, and 100% completion levels. In effect, they have
an input into all Navy construction design. Are these
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in-house engineers providing the Navy with the best design
available using the newest technology or are they being
hampered by a rigid adherence to the specification system?
Consider the procedure used by the in-house engineers
when working on a project design. The normal method for the
engineer is to take the applicable NAVFAC guide specifica-
tion and tailor it to the specific job. The guidance estab-
lishing this procedure is found either on the cover sheet or
in the notes of NAVFAC type specifications. A typical state-
ment would be: "This 'Type' specification shall not be ref-
erenced but is to be used as a manuscript in preparing
project specifications. Appropriate changes and additions
as may be necessary and as required by the notes must be
made," [Ref. 13, p. 3]. If the specification is a tri-serv-
ice specification, the note also includes the sentence: "No
deviations shall be made from this specification without
prior approval of the Naval Facilities Engineering Command,"
[Ref. 12, cover page]. These authors found considerable
divergence among the various EFDs visited concerning the
interpretation of the above quoted guidance. What consti-
tutes an appropriate change, addition, or a deviation re-
ceives a liberal interpretation by some personnel and a very
conservative one by others. Therefore, some personnel make
changes freely while others feel tightly bound by the printed
word in the specifications.
Generally speaking however, the policy of using a guide
specification as a manuscript, even with a liberal
20
interpretation, does not lend itself to the application of
the newest technologies to Navy design efforts, especially
if the guide specifications are obsolete. Without ample
incentive to do otherwise, it would be fairly easy to simply
utilize the guide specifications, making the obvious changes
but not really researching the possibilities of using new
materials or methods. To illustrate the potential detri-
mental effects, consider NAVFAC's specification in reference
to lintels over windows. The effective NAVFAC specification
called for 4-inch lintels over windows while the industry
standard for the same construction was changed to three
inches several years ago. The 3-inch lintels have proven
more than satisfactory yet because the NAVFAC guide specifi-
cation requires 4-inch lintels, the Navy continues to pay
the extra cost of using larger lintels in most of its con-
struction.
According to the interviews a major factor contributing
to this tendency to rely on the guide specifications rather
than researching each project is the fact that the design
engineers are always working under a time constraint. The
engineers are given a deadline to complete a project speci-
fication and to take the time to completely research each
aspect of the job would make it most difficult to meet that
deadline. Whatever the reason, the end result is that the
guide specifications are often being used with little criti-
cal review which has the effect of perpetuating a given




B. CHANGING A SPECIFICATION
The research problem notwithstanding, it seemed logical
to the authors that there must be numerous circumstances
where an engineer's previous experience and professional
knowledge provided him with a better method than the one re-
ferred to in the guide specifications. Given this circum-
stance, what would the engineers do to initiate a change to
incorporate improvements? The response to this question
during the interviews was very surprising. In fact, very
few personnel interviewed could identify a definite proce-
dure for recommending a change to a specification. Some
said they would tell their branch head, some would submit a
beneficial suggestion, and others were not concerned with
the problem, but almost no one could identify the proper
procedures for submitting a change. Further investigation
revealed that the only written guidance concerning changes
to NAVFAC specifications is in the form of a sentence some-
where in each specification which gives an address where
recommended changes are to be sent. It would seem that a
more active program to "arouse and motivate" the engineers
who work with the specifications daily would go far towards
updating the specification system and thereby improving Navy
construction.
Under the present system, to actually have a change
recommendation accepted and incorporated into a specifica-
tion is an unacceptably long process. By the time everyone
up through NAVFAC, or even beyond if another organization
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has cognizance over the specification in question, has ac-
cepted it, it is certainly too late to effect the particular
job that instigated the request. The change itself may even
be outdated. Appendix A is an actual case which has been
included to illustrate how the lack of timely action on
change requests can result in costly delays in introducing
superior products into Navy construction.
C. SPECIFICATION WAIVER AUTHORITY
There appears to be no official position by NAVFAC head-
quarters on the granting of waivers to specification re-
quirements. The procedure does however seem to be used on a
very informal basis, and to different degrees depending on
the personnel involved. The process seems to work as fol-
lows: Anyone, from the Navy inspector at the site to the
personnel at an EFD, may request a waiver of specifications.
Depending primarily on the magnitude of the deviation, the
specification in question, the urgency of the situation,
and most importantly the personnel involved, a decision may
be made on the waiver at almost any level. That is, some-
times the Resident Officer in Charge of Construction (ROICC)
grants the waiver and sometimes it gets all the way back to
NAVFAC Headquarters. There is one universal characteristic
of the whole informal waiver process however, and that is
the hesitancy of all concerned, especially NAVFAC Headquar-
ters, to grant any waivers in writing. This reluctance
down through the chain of command to make a commitment in
23
writing naturally breeds caution by all personnel, even when
a deviation from the specifications is obviously the best
solution.
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IV. INFLUENCE OF SPECIFICATION SYSTEM
ON NON-GOVERNMENT PERSONNEL
A. ARCHITECT-ENGINEERS DOING NAVY DESIGNS
Outside architect-engineer firms do approximately 70% to
75% of all Navy construction design work. They do virtually
all of the major design jobs. Consequently, the impact of
the specification system on these Navy contracted architect-
engineer firms is an important aspect of Navy construction.
To a man, every one of the numerous architect-engineers
interviewed agreed that the Navy's specification system had
detrimental effects on the final product. They felt that it
inhibited them from using the most recent design features
and materials. It also cost them a significant amount of
time wading through the lengthy specifications and looking
up the references in the guide specifications. Their candid
opinion was that reputable architect-engineers could pro-
vide the Navy with a better design, for less cost, and much
faster, if they were not as restricted by specifications as
they presently are.
Although there are cases where an architect-engineer
makes the effort and succeeds in implementing his idea even
though it differs from the specification, the normal prac-
tice seems to be that it is easier to do it the Navy way the
first time. The fiberglass storage tank mentioned earlier
is an example of successfully breaking down the specifica-
tion barrier. Several examples of "give them what they
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want" or "the Navy way" approach were also found. There
was one case in particular concerning a boiler specification
which appears to be representative and is the type of situa-
tion which discourages an architect-engineering firm from
introducing new ideas. In this case the architect-engineer
went to the local officer in charge of construction and re-
ceived verbal permission to use a boiler design which dif-
fered from the Navy specifications. The architect-engineer's
design was more modern and certainly included boiler systems
which were more available and therefore less expensive.
However, when his design reached the cognizant EFD for re-
view, it was rejected and he had to redo the entire boiler
section. Needless to say this particular architect-engineer
will be very hesitant in the future to introduce new tech-
nology which deviates from the Navy specifications.
B. THE ARCHITECT-ENGINEER WHO AVOIDS NAVY CONTRACTS
Another aspect of Navy construction which seems preva-
lent and which tends to contribute to the Navy's getting
less than optimal work on their construction projects has
to do with the architect-engineers and contractors who avoid
government work. Although there are other reasons for this,
the specification system seems to be the predominant one.
Almost all of the architect-engineers and contractors inter-
viewed said that they lost money on their first few Navy
contracts because they simply were not prepared to handle
the specification system. Besides learning to handle the
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specifications better after the first few contracts, they
also learned to submit higher bids to cover the added ex-
pense.
All of them did state that if they were offered roughly
equivalent commercial and Navy contracts they would take the
commercial one every time. Consequently, the better firms
and contractors who are competitive in the commercial market
are for the most part not doing the Navy construction. One
architect-engineer interviewed said that as a matter of pro-
fessional pride he researches the reasons whenever contrac-
tors do not bid his designs. He has found over the years
that the main reason why contractors do not bid his Navy de-
signs is that they do not want to contend with the specifi-
cation system and associated problems. When the best in the
field is only dealing with the Navy when commercial work is
not available, the Navy is not getting the optimum product
much of the time.
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V. VALUE ENGINEERING
Value Engineering has the potential to be one of the
most useful tools available to the EFD's in the reduction of
existing specification barriers. While value engineering
does not deal solely with specifications it can be used to
improve specifications. For that reason a discussion of
value engineering and its potential is presented in this
thesis.
A . BACKGROUND
The Navy's value engineering program is currently gov-
erned by NAVFAC instruction 4858. IB entitled Naval Facilities
Engineering Command Value Engineering (VE) Program dated 5
April 1973. Value Engineering is described by the Secretary
of the Navy as ". . . an effective method of obtaining effi-
cient functioning of parts, components and end items at the
most economical cost of total ownership. VE frequently pro-
vides other benefits of military worth, such as improved
performance, increased reliability and maintainability,"
[Ref. 17].
While the SECNAV does not refer specifically to speci-
fication barriers and technology transfer in this descrip-
tion it is obvious that he is describing the transfer of
new technological information into the field, thereby ob-
taining the greatest efficiency from both men and their
machines.
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B. IN-HOUSE VALUE ENGINEERING
The in-house program operates on the premise that Value
Engineering is similar to a number of techniques and skills
which all engineering related personnel must master and apply
to achieve reduced product cost and increased performance.
To this end, a training program has been established and all
practicing engineers are receiving training in the principles
and applications of value engineering. The Design and Archi-
tectual engineers that were interviewed by the authors
strongly maintained that it is their obligation to provide
the most economical design using the current specifications
and they, therefore, are routinely practicing value engi-
neering. Value engineering, the majority contended, is a
duplication of effort and amounts to a criticism of the de-
signs produced by the Project Engineer or the architect-
engineer. When questioned closer on this point most agreed
that value engineering was in fact an excellent idea and
more attention should be placed upon it.
C. THE ARCHITECT-ENGINEER/CONTRACTOR VALUE ENGINEERING
Most new technology comes from the architect-engineering
and contracting firms under contract with the government.
This is quite understandable when one remembers that these
private firms must survive in private industry and therefore
are always alert for new products or procedures which will
make them more competitive.
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The Architect-Engineer/Contractor should be a major
source of new technical data. However, because of the com-
plexity of requesting a modification of an existing specifi-
cation, (chapter II), and excessive time lags between input
and response, the industry tends to avoid the use of value
engineering when dealing with the government.
It is the contention of the authors that because of the
pressure of performance, job completion, current rapid tech-
nical changes and most importantly the futility of attempt-
ing to change existing specifications, optimum design and
construction is far from being achieved.
D. DEFICIENCIES IN VALUE ENGINEERING
Several major areas for improvement of the current value
engineering at Engineering Field Divisions are presented and
will be discussed in their order of importance as seen by
the authors.
1. Staffing
Currently the Engineering Field Divisions (EFD's)
have one engineer assigned to Value Engineering. This is
inadequate and may be a prime reason why value engineering
must struggle to survive. At best the Value Engineer can be
expected to "put out fires" rather than establish an effec-
tive Value Engineering department.
The recommendation of the authors would be to assign
at least one, preferably two, additional engineers to the
Value Engineering program. One of these engineers should be
the RDT&E liaison officer. In this way the division would
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have access to the most current information available and
thereby reduce the existing specification barrier.
The total additional cost of the manpower to staff
the required new position might come from the cost savings
resulting from an efficient program.
2. Incentives
Since its creation value engineering has had signif-
icant payoffs in DOD contracts. Therefore the authors be-
lieve that an additional means to obtain full and enthusiastic
support for the program should be investigated.
The Value Engineering Program Clause provides for
monetary rewards to contractors for their value engineering
efforts. Current procedures for providing recognition and
rewards through existing programs such as the Beneficial
Suggestion Program and The Annual Performance Award Program
have not proven effective or adequate. It is therefore
suggested that some form of sharing of the value engineering
savings be developed as an additional incentive to all in-
house engineers. Whether or not the incentive is provided
in a form of shared savings or a flat bonus, monetary con-
siderations may be the missing ingredient which could sport
interest in the value engineering program.
It is the contention of the authors that deserving
employees should be recognized and awarded for effective
cost savings actions in all government contracts. A cash




The purpose of this study has been to examine the hypoth-
esis that the current system of specifications utilized by
NAVFAC is a significant barrier to the transfer and utiliza-
tion of new technology into Navy construction.
A. CONCLUSIONS
1. Specifications are indeed a barrier to the transfer
of new technology into the Navy.
2. The specifications are generally obsolete and the
present system for updating them is inadequate.
3. In-House design engineers tend to use the current
specifications rather than attempt to inject new
technology because of the difficulty incurred in
changing specifications, and the lack of time for
research.
4. Architect-Engineer firms tend to do it the "Navy
Way" rather than battle the specification system.
5. The present specification waiver authority is am-
biguous and often misused.
6. Value engineering within the Navy is not being
utilized to the fullest extent.
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B. RECOMMENDATIONS
1. The waiver authority should, wherever possible, be
granted to the applicable EFD in writing by NAVFAC
2. The specific recommendations on Value Engineering




RUNWAY PVC JOINT SEALER
The first case is representative of the transfer of tech-
nology from a civilian firm to the Navy via a Value Engineer
at one of the NAVFAC Engineering Field Divisions. This op-
portunity for technology transfer often occurs when industry
feels they have a product which is superior to that which is
presently being used by the Navy. An industry representa-
tive simply attempts to market his product through one of
the value engineers at an Engineering Field Division. The
particular product in this case is a joint sealer for run-
ways and it demonstrates quite well how the present adminis-
trative system for changing a specification acts as a barrier
to technology transfer.
The Value Engineer at NAVFACENGCOM Western Division be-
came aware that the Navy was having problem with the runway
sealer presently in use. Rapid deterioration was common
with the defective material becoming hardened and loose.
Besides the direct repair and replacement cost involved,
there was concern that the deteriorating sealer was causing
damage to the jet aircraft using the runways. Consequently,
the value engineer from Western Division, during a visit to
NAVFAC Headquarters in October 1971, made a verbal request
that the NAVFAC Specifications Branch reevaluate NAVFAC
Specification 46 Ye which covered runway joint sealers. He
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provided extensive data on a runway joint sealer produced
by Superior Products Company (which he was convinced was of
a higher quality than that currently being used) and requested
that NAVFAC either consider a change to Specification 46 Ye
to include the new product or grant a general waiver allowing
its use. While the type of sealers required by Federal
Specifications SS-S164 and SS-S-167b were repeatedly ob-
served to have shown partial or complete failure within 18
months, the type of PVC sealer offered by Superior Products
Company was demonstrated to be in excellent condition after
nine years of use at various civilian airports. Additionally,
the current specification only requires a manufacturer's
warranty of one year whereas the new PVC sealer at that time
carried a five year warranty with the prospect of increasing
it to ten years.
Approximately two months later the Value Engineer at
Western Division received a reply to his request which is
included as enclosure (1). Basically the response was very
non-committal and introduced a considerable further delay
before any positive action would be taken on changing the
specification in question. Paragraph two in effect says
that the new PVC sealer does not meet the specifications and
no action will be taken until further investigation is con-
ducted. The requestor was told to personally inspect the
present condition of the new type sealer which had been in-
stalled on a runway at NAS , Fallon, Nevada in October 1965,
apparently in violation of specification 46 Ye. This
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expensive and time consuming step was required even though
the Value Engineer had already committed himself to the prod-
uct's superiority and it had demonstrated excellent per-
formance for over nine years at various international
airports. It is the last two sentences in paragraph four
that really give an indication of the time consuming process
involved in attempting to implement a significant change to
a specification. Basically, they say that if his personal
inspection at NAS Fallon is satisfactory then the new PVC
can be used on specific selected projects and thereby be
further evaluated for possible future inclusion in NAVFAC
criteria. Since the new sealer has already proven itself
for nine years, this could be a very long evaluation period.
It is apparent here why some private companies do not con-
sider it worthwhile to attempt to introduce their technology
into the government
.
Although his personal inspection of the NAS Fallon in-
stallation proved satisfactory as expected, no opportunity
to use the new PVC sealer on a selected project had occurred
by June 1972. At that time the Value Engineer from Western
Division, in a letter dated 14 June 1972, submitted an offi-
cial request to NAVFAC to change Specification 46 Ye. The
letter was submitted under the Value Engineering/Cost Savings
Program and is included as enclosure (2). The letter re-
quest was processed by NAVFAC and was eventually forwarded
to the Naval Civil Engineering Laboratory at Port Hueneme,
California for evaluation. Enclosure (3) is the Civil
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Engineering Laboratory's report which attests to the superi-
or performance of the new PVC sealer. The report is dated
7 December 1973, over two years from the time the initial
request was submitted. Even with the favorable endorsement
by CEL in December 1973, as of November 1974 the Value Engi-
neer at Western Division had not received and definite de-
cision on his change request.
In summary then, even when a significant amount of
evidence exists to support claims of superiority of a prod-
uct, it can still take over three years to effect a change
in the governing specifications to allow the product to be
used.
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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
NAVAL rACIUTIEt ENOINCIK'NG COMMANO
WAfcHINOTON.-b C 2 ;390
FAC 0A32/KP:b«b
DEC 17 1971
From: Commander, Naval Facilities Engineering Command
To: Commanding Officer, Western Division Naval Facilities
Engineering Command (Code 04B)
Subj : Evaluation of Superior Products Company PVC Joint
Sealer
1. In response to your verbal request, an evaluation of the
brochure and articles on subject materials has been completed
by cognizant personnel of this command.
2. Our evaluation indicates that Superior Products PVC
joint sealer does not conform to any of the materials speci-
fied in NAVFAC specification 46Ye, and could not be fur-
nished as an acceptable joint sealer on any Navy project
without a specific waiver. It is felt that there is insuf-
ficient justification at this time for granting a general
waiver or modifying the requirements of 46Ye to allow Supe-
rior Products to bid its material.
3. However, it is noted that the brochure refers to an
application of "Superseal" 444/777 under contract NBy 61195
of October 1965 at NAS Fallon, Nevada. If this installation
has proven to be acceptable and superior to materials pre-
sently being used, this Command will consider its further
use.
4. Accordingly, it is suggest
lation in question at NAS Fall
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The Value Engineering effort of the Western Division, Naval
Facilities Engineering Command is constantly searching for
new methods, products or materials which will improve con-
struction quality, eliminate high areas of construction costs,
and reduce future maintenance costs. A 1969 Air Force re-
port by Mr. Leslie B. Crowley, Senior Consultant, Directorate
of Civil Engineering, Headquarters U.S.A.F., stated that the
Air Force had annual jet engine maintenance costs of
$130,000,000 caused by rocks and foreign objects.
Except for the more costly polyurethane and polysulfide,
present airfield joint sealants are not resilient enough to
reject non-compressibles, often become sticky in warm weather
and retain the non-compressibles even though vacuumed and
swept, and most frequently shrink and harden in a short time.
Jet engine intake is powerful enough to pull these non-com-
pressibles out of the sticky sealant and the loose hardened
sealant out of the joints into the jet engine and cause
subsequent damage.
Mr. Crowley's report was discussed during the Value Engineer-
ing Seminar held at the Naval Facilities Engineering Command
in October of 1971, at which time a verbal request was made
to the Specification Branch, Naval Facilities Engineering
Command, for evaluation of the Superior Products Comapny PVC
Joint Sealers in 46Ye criteria.
Enclosure (1), Naval Facilities Engineering Command letter
of 17 December 1971, provided the authority to conduct a
limited study and an investigation to substantiate justifi-
cation for updating the requirements of the 46Ye specifica-
tions.
An initial investigation of Naval Air Station, Fallon,
Nevada and Naval Air Station, Lemoore, California, clearly
pointed out the importance of obtaining photographs and
Enclosure (2)
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additional information of other installations within the
geographic area of the Western Division having long histo-
ries of product success of Superseal 444 and Superseal 777,
hereinafter referred to as 444 and 777. Because of the na-
ture of information received, publications studies, and
letters of testimony of management and operational personnel,
sufficient positive documentation has been compiled for sub-
mission of the Superior Products Company 444/777 materials
for specification approval under the Engineering Investiga-
tion Program.
Observations of bases and airports, photographs, publications
studied, and joint sealant life investigated generally showed
significant failure of the present Federal Specification
SS-S-164 (SS-S-1401A) , and SS-S-167b materials within six
(6) months to eighteen (18) months. Sealants which, at pre-
sent, do not qualify under Federal Specification 46Ye have
been observed and certifications received from the various
air bases and airports where the Superior Products materials
have been in place nine (9) years or more are still in ex-
cellent condition. This information pointed out the follow-
ing items of interest:
1. The cause of jet motor damage is:
a. Aircraft maintenance, to a limited degree, estab-
lished by observing small nuts and bolts found gen-
erally on the apron area.
b. Station forces maintenance:
(1) Dust and small rocks blown onto the runways and
aprons from untreated soil adjacent to runways,
taxiways, and aprons.
(2) Inadequacies of available sweeping and vacuum-
ing methods of runways, aprons, and taxiways
(non-compressibles adhering to sticky and un-
resilient sealants), (shrunken and hardened
joint sealer not being removed).
(3) The primary and most obvious source of motor
damage was hardened pieces of deteriorated
joint sealants.
(4) The joint sealer failure (3), above, contributes
to other areas of failure.
(a) Spalling of joints.
(b) Random cracking.
(c) Faulting (raised or lowered slabs).
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2. Areas and means of eliminating joint failures:
a. Utilization of joint sealant materials with a histo-
ry of acceptable usage.
b. Application of joint sealant:
(1) Joint preparation: Joints must be clean and
dry. The sealant is very fluid at the pouring
temperature, and requirement for use of cord or
roving at the bottom of the joint should be en-
forced to insure against loss of material
(voids) and to insure obtaining of proper joint
sealant shape factor.
(2) Cleaning of joints:
(a) New concrete pavement: All new joints
(except expansion joints) should be formed
or sawed to produce a minimum joint size
of 3/8" x lj" at appropriate joint spacing.
Prior to sealing the joint, surfaces should
be cleaned of all dirt, curing compount
residue, laitance and any other foreign
material. Clean by sandblasting thoroughly.
Immediately prior to sealing, joints should
be blown, using a minimum of 100 psi oil-
free compressed air.
(b) Old concrete pavement: For resealing of
joints, the old sealant in the joint should
be plowed out and the joint widened to
J" x li ' , using a concrete saw. Joints
should be cleaned of all old sealant. Re-
move all foreign material by sandblasting
thoroughly. Immediately prior to sealing,
joints should be blown, using a minimum of
100 psi of oil-free compressed air.
(3) Application: Joints should be filled from the
bottom of the li ' deep joint to i" below flush,
+ 1/16".
(4) Sealant should not be poured below 50 degrees F.
(5) Joints to be clean so that no residue will re-
main on finger rubbed over surface of saw cut
after sandblasting.
3. Obvious signs of sealant failures:
a. Bubbles in the sealant allowing water, jet fuel,
sand, etc., to infiltrate through the joint into the
subgrade.
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b. Loss of sealant bond to joint sidewall.
c. Cracking or cohesive failure in sealant.
d. Flowing of sealant down into or out of joint.
e. Loss of resilient or rubber-like properties.
f. Sealant that has pumped or extruded out of joint.
g. Assimilation of sand into soft sealant which accel-
erates hardening.
The report was compiled from observations and evaluations of
items 1 through 10 by the Western Division Value Engineering
(assigned the reporting responsibility).
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Items 11 through 23 are solicited reports, comments, tests
and allied information related to the performance capabil-










8. Los Angeles International Airport
9. Sacramento Metropolitan Airport
10. California Highway No. 395, El Cajon Pass
11. Wichita Municipal Airport
12. Kansas City International Airport
13. Mather AFB
14. Dallas-Fort Worth International Airport
15. Illinois State Toll Highway Authority
16. Louisiana, Department of Highways, Assistant
Materials Engineer
17. Arizona State Highway - Advertisement for Bids:
Nogales - Tuscon Highway
Cordes Junction - Flagstaff
18. Florida-Jacksonville Port Authority - Technical
Specialist - Warranty
19. San Francisco International Airport - Warranty
20. Hill AFB: (a) Contract, (b) Warranty, (c) Material
Report, (d) Laboratory Report
21. Louisiana, Greater Baton Rouge Airport District -
Supplier Warranty
22. NAS Alameda, California - Specifications
23. Publications:
a. Public Works Magazine, Nov 1971 - PVC Joint
Sealants
b. Civil Engineering Magazine, Mar 1972 - Pavement
Joint Seals
24. Symposium:
a. Bureau of Public Roads, Washington, D.C.
,
Sept 1970
b. Highway Research Board, Washington, D.C,
Jan 1972
25. Manufacturers' literature and specifications.
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ONE-YEAR WARRANTY MATERIALS (PRESENT 46Ye MATERIALS)
a. Initial cost first-year installation
b. Replacement cost during year 2
c. Replacement costs during years 4-6-8-10
d. Initial cost first-year installation of 444/777 materi-
als (10-year plus life)
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Maximum saving $ 91,500
$102,750
NOTE : The above savings computed at an average cost, not
reflecting escalation increases, shows an existing hypotheti-
cal joint sealant maintenance program indicating a 10-year
potential saving.
The joint cleaning operation removes and eliminates
the old hardened and oxidized pieces of sealant, which can-
not be removed by sweeping or vacuum maintenance, but which
are sucked up by jet aircraft engines.
A second magnitude of savings is the extension of
service life of runways, aprons, etc., by elimination of
spalling, pumping, and damage to subgrade.
Third, and primary magnitude savings is accomplished
by the elimination of "foreign object" jet engine damage
reported to be $130,000,000 in 1969 by the U.S. Air Force.
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A conservative estimate of Naval jet engine damage warrants
the basic intent of this report which is an annual savings,
by elimination, of an area of high cost maintenance.
CONCLUSIONS :
1. The PVC joint sealer 444/777 gives evidence of being su-
perior to corresponding SS-S-164 and SS-S-167b, the
products now specified.
2. The joint sealers now used often require replacement from
approximately six months to one year, with total replace-
ment usually necessary within two to three years. 444/
777 will require replacement a minimum of once every ten
years or more. 444/777 has been observed in excellent
condition after nine years in place.
3. Navy aircraft jet engine damage at all land-based facil-
ities may be reduced $50,000,000 per year (estimated).
This is an estimated conclusion based on an Air Force
report of 1969 and is not substantiated by any known
Navy report of yearly jet motor damage by "foreign ob-
jects."
RECOMMENDATIONS :
1. That Superior Products PVC joint sealants 444 and 777 be
evaluated for Federal Specification approval.
2. PVC sealant 444 is for sealing joints in concrete high-
ways and runways, and PVC sealant 777 is for critical
areas of concrete airfields subject to jet-fuel spillage
and limited jet-blast such as taxiways, parking areas,
wash racks, maintenance aprons, and maintenance hangars.
3. That the attached manufacturer's recommended non-propri-
etary performance specifications for the PVC 444 and
PVC 777 sealants be reviewed for consideration as the
basis for respective Federal specifications for all
services for a premium type, long-lasting sealant highly
resistant to aging and weathering.
4. That the present military one (1) year warranty for
joint sealants be increased to 5 years non-prorated plus
5 years prorated. The job quality control then becomes
the direct responsibility of the contractor/applicator
to insure application during dry weather, temperatures
at time of application above 50 degrees f, joints cleaned
as specified, and joint filling accomplished as speci-
fied. Improper cleaning will produce bond failure ini-
tially, as will overfilling. The 444/777 sealants are
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self-inspecting to the point where the Government Inspector
will inspect for Government acceptance of installation to
see that the joints are filled to the proper depth, filled
to i" + 1/16" below flush with pavement surface, and to test
for bond of the sealant to the joint sidewall. Any and all
of these deficiencies would have to be corrected by removing,
cleaning, and applying new 444/777 sealant.
RICHARD ENGELS











To: Commander, Naval Facilities Engineering Command
Sub j : WESTDIVNAVFAC Value Engineer Study of Polyvinylchloride
Joint Sealant Performance; review and comments on
1. NAVFAC requested that NCEL review and comment on the
subject informal report, submitted by Mr. Richard Engels,
WESTDIVNAVFAC, concerning performance of a polyvinylchloride
(PVC) joint sealant material, Superseal 777, on a number of
military and civil airfield installations. There is pre-
sently no Federal Specification for this type sealant materi-
al. The report recommended that sealants such as Superseal
777, which can be warranted for up to 10 years, be considered
for Federal Specification approval, based on the comparatively
better performance shown by the PVC material in contrast to
a history of poor performance by other joint seal materials
now covered by Federal Specifications. In support of his
recommendation, Mr. Engels also included supplemental infor-
mation concerning present levels of foreign object damage
(FOD) to jet aircraft deriving from deteriorated joint seals,
and he developed cost comparisons between the use of present-
ly specified sealants with one year warranties and the PVC
materials with up to a ten year warranty.
2. NCEL has reviewed the subject report and has the follow-
ing comments:
a. Although some of the data provided by Mr. Engels as
supplemental information are based on either subjective ob-
servations or, as in the case of yearly FOD damage estimates,
on suspect information from non-Navy sources, it is noted
from NCEL experience that joint sealant materials as presently
specified and as presently emplaced often harden, lose bond,
or otherwise deteriorate with unacceptable rapidity. Almost
without exception, NCEL pavement evaluation and condition
surveys found defective joint seals and joint spalls to be
the only preponderant defects in portland cement concrete
airfield pavements within the Navy and Marine Corps. NCEL
can thus support the conclusion that present sealant speci-
fications and application techniques do not produce wholly
acceptable joint seal applications.
Enclosure (3)
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Sub j : WESTDIVNAVFAC Value Engineer Study of Polyvinylchloride
Joint Sealant Performance; review and comments on
b. Mr. Engels presented considerable data, both from
personal observations and from solicited testimonials, to
show that the PVC sealant has been successfully used over a
range of facilities and climatic conditions, with most in-
stallations in excellent condition after periods of use of
up to 10 years. An NCEL engineer has personally viewed the
PVC sealant at Los Angeles International Airport which is in
excellent condition after almost 10 years in place. There-
fore, it appears that the PVC materials may perform at least
as well as, and probably better than, some presently speci-
fied sealant materials. Also, PVC joint seal life expect-
ancy can possibly be 3 to 4 times that of some presently-
used sealants.
c. Poor workmanship in preparing pavement joints and in
placing sealant materials may contribute as much as poor
sealant properties to early failure of joint seals. An ex-
pected advantage of a warranted sealant application, as
offered by the PVC sealant manufacturer, may be an increased
attention to workmanship in these areas on the part of the
sealing contractor.
3. To determine how the PVC sealant relates to present
Federal Specifications for joint sealants, NCEL made a brief
review of these documents. It was noted that the PVC most
nearly corresponded to the SS-S-200D Specification in terms
of material properties. As a single component, hot poured
material, however, the PVC does not conform to the 200D
Specification description of a "two-component, cold-applied"
material. The PVC sealant exceeds the requirements of the
SS-S-167b and SS-S-1614 Specifications in that it provides
for jet blast resistance, as these specifications do not.
PVC sealant also costs almost twice as much as the average
material provided under the 167b or 1614 Specifications.
4. Although this letter is intended to comment mainly on
the subject WESTDIVNAVFAC report, the need for improved
joint sealants must be viewed within the context of the ex-
hibited poor performance of joint sealant materials now in
use, particularly those supplied under the SS-S-164, 167b or
1614 Specifications. These materials often do not perform
in place as required or desired. Common deficiencies include
bubbling and/or mushrooming of new seals, loss of bond, and
either early loss of resiliency or occasional reversion to a
tacky consistency which traps and holds incompressibles.
Some of these defects do not show up within the first year
of use. In order to improve overall field performance of
joint sealants, as well as to allow the use of the PVC seal-
ants on Navy pavements when appropriate and desirable, NCEL
suggests the following for consideration by NAVFAC
:
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Subj : WESTDIVNAVFAC Value Engineer Study of Polyvinylchloride
Joint Sealant Performance; review and comments on
a. Tighten the requirements of the present SS-S-164,
SS-S-167b and SS-S-1614 Specifications to prevent the use of
the poorer, short-lived sealants which occasionally show up
under these specifications. This will likely require a re-
view of present specification requirements and conformance
tests, and possibly should include consideration of the use
of the weatherometer test, as now required for SS-S-200D
sealants. Apparently, many materials now acceptable under
the 164, 167b or 1614 Specifications cannot pass the weather-
ometer test. It seems logical to require these materials to
be as resistant to weathering as the 200D materials.
b. Improve contractor adherence to required sealant
placement techniques by requiring more than a one-year war-
ranty on joint seal performance, particularly regarding
sealant bond to the pavement and quality of the sealant ma-
terials. One recent joint resealing contract awarded at NAS
Lemoore, California, required a five year joint seal per-
formance warranty from the sealing contractor. This was
accompanied by a five year material warranty from the PVC
sealant manufacturer, who insisted on rigid contractor ad-
herence to specified placement techniques and who provided a
representative to ensure such compliance during the initial
joint cleaning and sealant application efforts.
c. Consider revising the SS-S-200D Specification to
allow the single component, hot poured PVC sealants to be
bid under that specification'. Such a revision of that one
specification would not be a total solution to the overall
problem of poor joint seal performance, however, as it ap-
pears that materials accepted under other than the 200D
Specification are those which exhibit the most deficiencies
in field performance.
5. Obviously, the items suggested above would require de-
tailed and critical evaluation before they could be adopted.
If NCEL can be of assistance in these areas, personnel and
facilities can be made available. Coordination of such ef-
forts can be made with Mr. C. R. White or Mr. D. J. Lambiotte,
Soils and Pavements Division, Naval Civil Engineering Lab-
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